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INTRODUCTION
In their Supplemental Brief of the Appellants, the Harveys concentrate on one
central argument - that the 2003 version of the Disconnection Statute should not be
applied retroactively. While making this argument, the Harveys overlook the fact that the
District Court did not apply the 2003 version of the Disconnection Statute retroactively.
[R. 1111.] The District Court detemiined that there was "no material difference on the
dispositive point of law" between the 2001 and 2003 versions of the Disconnection
Statute. [Id.] Under either version, a disconnection petition creating an unincorporated
island would be disallowed. [Id.] The text of the 2001 Disconnection Statute and the text
of the 2003 Disconnection statute both forbid any disconnection that would create an
island.
In their Supplemental Brief, the Harveys also attack the annexation they requested
which moved their property from unincorporated Utah County into the municipality of
Cedar Hills. Potential defects in the annexation were not relevant to the District Court's
order and are irrelevant on appeal.
RESPONSE TO HARVEYS' STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The Harveys assert in their Supplemental Brief that they are simply trying "to
provide the court with some factual background." Supplemental Brief of Appellants at 8.
However, the factual background provided by the Harveys is irrelevant and unhelpful in
assisting this Court with its consideration of the District Court's June 3, 2008 Order,
which the Harveys have specifically appealed. In particular, the Harveys identified what
they characterize as "relevant" facts regarding the annexation of their property into Cedar
4833-13 30-2531.CE003.002
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Hills. Several of the facts presented by the Harveys concerning the annexation of their
property are not entirely accurate, but also such alleged facts are irrelevant and play no
part in resolving the question before this Court—whether the District Court properly
determined to grant summary judgment to Cedar Hills and deny the Harveys'
disconnection petition. Indeed, before the District Court, the Harveys at one point agreed
they "should not be permitted to present evidence of procedural defects in the
annexation."

[R 746, 753.]

Arguments regarding the annexation of the Harveys'

property into Cedar Hills did not play any role in the District Court's ruling on the
Harvey's disconnection petition. In addition, the Harveys did not raise this argument as
an issue on appeal.1 Therefore, the Harvey's cannot raise it now. See Gildeav. Guardian
Title Co. of Utah, 2001 UT 75, flO n.l, 31 P.3d 543 (issues not raised in the opening
brief are considered waived).
The Harveys' Statement of Relevant facts also includes several paragraphs
containing legal conclusions regarding the Harveys' ability to challenge the original
annexation and to pursue their disconnection petition. Supplemental Brief of Appellants
at 7. While Cedar Hills recognizes that the District Court issued a ruling on January 8,
2006, addressing some of these legal questions [R. 655-60], Cedar Hills also notes that
this ruling is not the subject of the Harveys' appeal. In its January 8, 2006 ruling, the

1

Concerning the issues raised on appeal, Cedar Hills noted in its Brief of Appellee that
the Harveys had failed to identify the standard of review and citations to the record for
each of their four identified issues on appeal. See Brief of Appellee at 2. The Harveys
rectify this omission in their supplemental brief, but only identify three issues on appeal.
See Supplemental Brief of Appellants at 2-3. It appears therefore, that the Harveys have
waived the fourth issue on appeal originally contained in their Brief of Appellant.
4833-1330-2531.CE003.002
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District Court merely held that the Harveys were "free to pursue their disconnection
petition." [R. 655.] Otherwise, Cedar Hills factual position remains as stated in its Brief
of Appellee, pages 6 through 10.
ARGUMENT
In their supplemental brief, the Harveys assert that the 2003 Disconnection Statute
should not be retroactively applied because doing so "will eliminate and destroy the
Harveys' vested right to legally challenge the city's actions." Supplemental Brief of
Appellants at 10. The Harveys' argument should fail, however, because (1) both the
plain language of both the 2001 and 2003 versions of the Disconnection Statute forbid the
creation of islands, and (2) because the Harveys did not have an inviolate "vested right"
pursue its disconnection petition.
A.

The District Court Held that Both the 2001 and 2003 Disconnection
Statutes Prohibit the Creation of Islands.

The Harveys argued against retroactive application of the 2003 Disconnection
Statute in their original Brief of Appellants. See Brief%ofAppellants at 16-19. Cedar Hills
hereby incorporates all of its arguments contained in its Brief of Appellee addressing all
of the Harveys' arguments challenging the validity of the District Court's June 3, 2008
Order, including the retroactivity argument.
Nevertheless, to further address the Harveys' arguments against retroactive
application of the 2003 version of the Disconnection Statue, Cedar Hills first notes that
the Harveys do not dispute that their petition to disconnect would create an island of
unincorporated property in Utah County completely surrounded by the cities of Cedar
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Hills and Pleasant Grove. [R. at 1122: 19:11-14.] The 2003 Disconnection Statute
clearly disallows a disconnection petition that would create an unincorporated island. See
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii) (2003) (placing the burden of proof on the
disconnection petitioners to show by a preponderance of evidence that the proposed
disconnection will not create an unincorporated island or peninsula). As explained more
fully below, the plain language of the 2001 Disconnection Statute also forbids islands.
Under the both the 2001 and 2003 version of the Disconnection Statute, the District Court
was required to dismiss the Harveys5 petition because they could not meet this burden of
proof given the admission that the disconnection petition would create an unincorporated
island.
The plain language of the 2001 Disconnection Statute prohibits islands.

The

District Court was required to evaluate "whether or not islands or unreasonably large or
varied-shaped peninsular land masses result within or project into the boundaries of the
municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected." Id. at § 10-2-503(2)(i). If
an island is created, this criteria, by itself, requires the dismissal of a disconnection
petition, like the one filed by the Harveys. The dispositive nature of this criteria is
manifest in the evaluation of "unreasonable" peninsulas. If a petition creates a peninsula
that is unreasonable, it cannot be allowed because that would be unreasonable. To argue
that this criteria is not dispositive suggests that "unreasonable" peninsulas are permitted
by the 2001 Disconnection Statute. The far better reading of the 2001 Disconnection
Statutes is that all "unreasonable" peninsulas are prohibited.
forbidden the same as the most unreasonable of peninsulas.
4833-1330-2531 CE003 002

A

And, all islands are

Under the 2001 Disconnection Statute, the District Court must consider whether a
"proposed disconnection satisfies all of the criteria in Section 10-2-503." Utah Code
Ann. § 10-2-506(4) (2001). The District Court must make its determination based upon
the evidence presented at a hearing, and at the hearing, the burden of proof is on the
petitioners to "prove the viability of the disconnection . . . by a preponderance of the
evidence." Id. at § 10-2-506(3) (2001). At the heart of this dispute is the criteria in
Section 10-2-503(2)(i) of "whether or not islands or unreasonably large or varied-shaped
peninsular land masses result within or project into the boundaries of the municipality
from which the territory is to be disconnected." Id. at § 10-2-503(2)(i) (2001). A
disconnection petition that creates an island or unreasonable peninsula violates Section
10-2-503. An unreasonable impact on one or more of the criteria in Section 10-2-503
prohibits disconnection. Since the Harveys' disconnection petition would not satisfy one
of the criteria of Section 10-2-503, the District Court could not grant the Harveys'
petition under the 2001 Disconnection Statute. Thus, the District Court was required to
deny the Harveys' petition, whether considered under the 2001 or the 2003 version of the
Disconnection Statute, because it is undisputed that an island would have been created.
The Order, signed by Judge Taylor on June 3, 2008, states that "the Court finds
that there is no material difference on the dispositive point of law between the two
versions of the statute at issue. Under either the 2001 or the 2003 version of the
Disconnection statute, if a disconnection would result in an unincorporated island, the
disconnection should be disallowed."

[R. at 1111.]

The Order says nothing about

applying the 2003 Disconnection Statute retroactively. Instead, the District Court held
4833-1330-2531.CE003.002
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that applying either version of the Disconnection Statute would require the same result dismissal of the Harveys' disconnection petition.

The Harveys' argument against

retroactive application of the 2003 Disconnection Statute is therefore invalid unless this
Court determines that the District Court erred in its interpretation of the 2001 and 2003
Disconnection Statute and holds that the District Court should have solely applied the
2003 Disconnection Statute to resolve the matter.
Even if arguendo, this Court determines that the District Court applied the 2003
Disconnection Statute retroactively, it should nevertheless uphold the District Court's
ruling. Concerning retroactive application, Cedar Hills refers this Court to its argument
in its Brief of Appellee at pages 24 to 27.

Further, Utah courts have held that

"[gjenerally, new procedural rules do not affect proceedings completed prior to
enactment." State v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1001 (Utah 1982). It is important to note that
the Harveys acquiesced in the procedural requirements of the 2003 Disconnection
Statute. [R. 811.] The 2003 version of the Disconnection Statute merely clarified that
the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the disconnection
would not create an unincorporated island. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii)
(2003). Under the 2001 Disconnection Statute, one of the criteria for consideration was
whether the disconnection created islands, see Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-503(2)(i) (2001),
and the petitioner had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the disconnection
was viable, see Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-506(3) (2001). Both versions of the statute
required the same consideration and placed the same burden of proof on the petitioners.
As to the dispositive issue in this case, there was no substantive change. Where the
4833-1330-2531.CE003.002
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substance of the law has not changed, the general rule against retroactive application of a
statute does not apply. Therefore, even if only the 2003 Disconnection Statute applied to
the Harveys' disconnection petition, the District Court's decision should be upheld.
B.

The Harveys Do Not Have A Vested Right to Obtain Disconnection.

The Harveys also assert that they had a vested right to bring a disconnection
petition because the District Court held on January 5, 2007, that the Harveys were "free
to continue to pursue their disconnection petition." [R. at 655.] The fact that the District
Court ruled that the Harveys could pursue a disconnection petition does not mean that the
Harveys had a vested right to obtain a disconnection.
"The law in this state, as it is elsewhere, is that 'no one has a vested right in any
rule of law' under either the open courts or the due process provisions of the Utah
Constitution." Berry ex rel Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp,, 111 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah
1985) (further citation omitted). It is true that "once a cause of action under a particular
rule of law accrues to a person by virtue of an injury to his rights, that person's interest in
the cause of action and the law which is the basis for a legal action becomes vested." Id.
While a person may thus have the right to pursue a particular claim, the person does not
necessarily obtain a vested right in a particular procedure. See Bd. of Equalization v.
Utah State Tax Comin'n, 864 P.2d 882, 884 (Utah 1993). In addition, a person must
establish that he or she is entitled to a remedy under that particular cause of action.
In this case, the Harveys have not been deprived of the opportunity to bring their
disconnection petition. As stated in the District Court's Memorandum Decision dated
January 5, 2007, the Harveys were free to continue pursuing their disconnection petition.
4833-1330-2531.CE003.002
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[R. 655.] But, the Harveys did not have a vested right to a ruling in their favor because
the law as applied to the facts did not justify granting their disconnection petition. The
undisputed fact that their disconnection petition would create an unincorporated island
deprived the Harveys of the ability to obtain approval of their disconnection petition. See
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-503(2)(i) (2001) and Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii)
(2003).
By denying the Harveys' disconnection petition and granting summary judgment
to Cedar Hills, the District Court did not deprive the Harveys of a vested right. The
District Court merely determined that the Harveys, under both the 2001 and the 2003
versions of the Disconnection Statute were not entitled to have their petition granted
because granting the petition would create an unincorporated island in violation of the
statute.
The fact that the District Court was required to deny the Harveys' petition under
the both the 2001 and the 2003 version of the Disconnection statute does not deny the
Harveys of a vested right. Because the District Court's ruling did not affect any vested
right that the Harveys may have had, this Court should affirm the ruling of the District
Court below since summary judgment should be affirmed when the record shows "that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56 (2008); Davis County Solid Waste
Management v. City of Bountiful, 2002 UT 60,1J9, 52 P.3d 1174.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the Harveys' contention, the District Court did not retroactively apply
4833-1330-2531.CE003.002
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the 2003 Disconnection Statute. Even if it had, the District Court's ruling should be
affirmed because the 2003 version of the Disconnection Statute is not substantively
different from the 2001 version for the dispositive issue in this case. Further, the District
Court's actions did not deprive the Harveys of a vested right. In any event, because the
plain language of both the 2001 and 2003 versions of the Disconnection Statute prohibit
the creation of unincorporated islands, the District Court correctly dismissed the Harveys'
petition for disconnection and granted summary judgment to Cedar Hills. Therefore,
Cedar Hills respectfully requests that the ruling of the District Court be AFFIRMED.

DATED: May 27, 2009,

SMITH HARTVIGSEN,

PLLC

Eric Todd Johnson
R. Christopher Preston
Kyle Fielding
Attorneys for the City of Cedar Hills
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